Law with the Sound of Its Own Making by Mandic, D. & Mandic, D.
Law Text Culture 
Volume 24 Article 20 
2020 
Law with the Sound of Its Own Making 
Danilo Mandic 
University of Westminster, d.mandic@westminster.ac.uk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc 
Recommended Citation 
Mandic, Danilo, Law with the Sound of Its Own Making, Law Text Culture, 24, 2020, 515-549. 
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol24/iss1/20 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Law with the Sound of Its Own Making 
Abstract 
This paper makes use of Robert Morris’s Box with the Sound of Its Own Making (1961) as an analogy and 
a structural device to put forward an understanding of law as a sonic artefact. Similar to this sculpture, or 
sound of sculpture for that matter, it proposes that law, a statue-like formation, is constituted by its own 
ever-lasting sounding that continuously shapes the spatial and temporal field in which it reverberates and 
encloses subjects and objects. By resisting law’s tendency to instrumentalise and objectify sound, the 
paper argues that such sonic quality cannot be reduced to law’s own pronouncements and vocalisations 
only. Instead, it traces the sonic beyond that which is audible to law or what an ear can hear. By drawing 
on the work of the French philosopher Michel Serres it demonstrates the relational qualities of sound, 
noise, and hearing as intrinsic qualities to the body and functioning of law. Approaching sound and its 
relation to law in this way not only brings forward questions about the ontological bearings of law, but it 
also allows to sound out novel epistemological passages for hearing, understanding, and thinking about 
law. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol24/iss1/20 
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Facet 1 [Box]
Box with the Sound of Its Own Making (1961), first exhibited at Green 
Gallery in New York in 1963, is one of the first works in a series of small 
sculptures that the American minimal artist Robert Morris produced in 
the early 1960s. In light of minimalist art’s moving away, and therefore 
questioning modernist approaches to making and understanding 
artworks, this seminal work challenged many of the established 
formalist norms by questioning what constitutes an art object (or a 
sculpture), and in particular its relation to the viewer and environment 
(Kim-Cohen 2009, Weiss 2013, Strickland 1993). Box with the Sound 
is a cube made out of walnut wood with identical dimensions of nine 
and three-quarters inches on each side. The sculpture is mounted on 
a pedestal. Inside the box there is a speaker that plays the three-hour-
and-a-half long recording made during the construction of the box by 
the artist. The sounds are those of sawing, hammering and sanding. 
To the intrinsically silent quality of the wooden sculpture, Morris 
integrates sound as both medium and material in order to not only 
actualise and exhibit an object (the box) but also to question what 
constitutes the production and representation of the work. Regarded as 
one of the earliest works that simultaneously functions ‘as a sculpture 
and a sound work’, Box with the Sound concerns experience, reception, 
interactivity, the interplay between form and content, as well as notions 
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of  ‘authorship, reflexivity and intentionality (the box clearly didn’t make 
itself )’, thus establishing itself as a seminal marker to the discourses of 
sound art and conceptual art practices (Kim-Cohen 2009: 40-80, Bird 
1999: 158, LaBelle 2015, Bryan-Wilson 2013).1
In the period between 1961 and 1964, Morris constructed a 
number of small sculptures (many of which were boxes in different 
contexts) that were ‘portraying the changing status of medium through 
representational means’ (Weiss 2013: 58). These ‘process-type objects’, 
in Morris’s own words, had a rule to ‘evidence, or at least suggest, an 
event … a generative one which reduces agency and leaves the object as 
a trace or indexical sign’ (ibid: 308). While the evidential nature of the 
work, in both its visual and sonic sensations, encapsulates the artist’s 
labour, the recording playing on loop from within the box demonstrates 
sonic agency in the material construction of the box. Accordingly, 
through the ‘process [that] is not visible’ although the fabrication is 
exposed, the box simultaneously conceals and reveals its actualisation 
– that of being made and making of (Morris 1993: 45). The work, 
as such, encompasses the spatial and temporal overlap of sculpture’s 
fabrication and form, as well as the ‘relationships to and between process 
and product, the space of production versus the space of reception, and 
the time of making relative to the time of beholding’ (Weiss 2013: 46, 
Kim-Cohen 2009: 47). Is the sound that we listen to evidence of the 
event that took place? Is the sound or the actual box a trace of that 
process? Is the sound the material of the box, or it just ‘points toward 
the immaterial of the box as concept’ (Voegelin 2014: 91)?
As already indicated in the title of this paper, the analogy to law is 
lucid here. This apparent simplicity, stillness and finality of a sculpture 
on a pedestal resonates with the image of law and its stature.2 Similar 
to this sculpture of sound, or sound of sculpture for that matter, I 
propose that law, a statue-like formation, is constituted by its own 
ever-lasting sounding by which it continuously shapes the spatial and 
temporal fields in which it reverberates. The particular mobility of sound 
that is in direct tension with the inertness of the box, furthermore, 
demonstrates an interplay between movement and stillness, time and 
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space, substance and appearance, inside and outside, process and form, 
action and norm, integrity and division – all the fundamentals to the 
body and functioning of law. Box with the Sound, both in its process 
of making and in the act of its exhibiting, opens passages through 
which to sound out law’s formal presence and ever-present formation, 
its permanent stature and perennial sonority.   
In what follows, I engage with tracing and apprehending law’s 
own sonic quality. Such an attempt, I suggest, cannot be achieved by 
reducing the sonic merely to law’s own pronouncements, enunciations 
and vocalisations; or to the subjects and objects that law gives a voice to 
(or not); but also, it cannot be limited to the law’s association to music 
or harmony. Put differently, while these different audible instances 
inform a large portion of law’s resounding, as well as the discourses that 
surround it, I argue that there is a sonic quality to law that precedes 
and goes beyond that which is ‘audible’ to law, or merely reducible to 
what an ear can hear.3 Challenging as it sounds, I suggest that sound’s 
intangible but material quality not only allows possibilities to grasp 
processes and functions that go beyond law’s own representation and 
form, but also reveals itself as an intrinsic feature to the edifice of 
law. To this end, I approach sound as a medium, model, method, and 
metaphoric device – conceptual and material – with and through which 
we can engage with hearing, understanding and thinking about law. 
The significance of viewing and listening to Box with the Sound lies in 
its potential to provide two different analogical modes that run parallel 
in this paper: the semblance of law to the actual box and the sound 
of its own making; and thinking of law as sound, thereby identifying 
properties that they share. Analogies can indeed be fruitful devices for 
identifying similarities, but they also run the risk of becoming banal. 
On that account, and as demonstrated below, in parallel to its analogical 
quality, Box with the Sound is primarily deployed as a structural device, 
an epistemic tool, or a basis for a topological engagement with law as 
a sonic artefact.4 Accordingly, the discussion does not aim to engage 
with a methodological approach of opening boxes in order to grasp 
the specific processes and peculiar ways in which law operates and 
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functions, how law on the books differs from law in action, nor with 
the success or failure of  law’s declaratory and procedural proclamations. 
On the basis of the box from where this sounding out begins, this 
performative and almost absurd (out of tune) reading corresponds 
to the six faces of its cubic shape. While interconnected as a whole, 
each facet is free-standing and by no means the suggested titles – box, 
statue, sound, noise, hearing and episteme – aim to present themselves 
as a finite, conclusive or closed interpretations of the issue at hand. 
Constitutive of the box under observation, they provide passages to 
discern and apprehend law’s varied acoustic qualities and functions, 
but also introduce different standpoints to the established discourse 
surrounding law and sound. Corresponding to Box with the Sound, the 
discussion below documents its process by tracing different lines of 
thought and crossing different realms in sounding out the sound of law. 
In order to put forward an understanding of law by way of the two 
simultaneous analogies read with and through Box with the Sound, 
I appreciably turn to the work of the French philosopher of science 
Michel Serres. In his extensive and distinctive scholarship, which 
traverses and connects seemingly disparate categories of knowledge, 
the notions of statue, box, hearing, sound and noise have been recurring 
in different forms when commenting on the origins and formations 
of culture, societies and knowledge, in which law both implicitly and 
explicitly takes place (Abbas 2005, Mandic 2017, Dolphijn 2018). 
Echoing Serres’s itinerant mode of exploring, in which the subject 
matter and the method of enquiry often coalesce, the discussion 
touches upon different aspects, notions and gestures in and through 
which law’s sound can be apprehended. Finally, by looking into the 
relational qualities of law, sound and the notion of noise, it brings 
forward questions about law’s ontological bearings, but also about the 
established epistemological passages for thinking about law. 
Facet 2 [Statue]
The primary quality of rectangular forms has a long history but, as 
Morris notes, it is only in minimalist art when ‘the forms of the cubic 
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and the rectangular’ become ‘self-sufficient’ and inform ‘the final 
definition of the work’ (Morris 1993: 41). A cube is the only solid 
hexahedron, perfectly symmetrical with six equal squares, ‘a rectangular 
parallelepiped whose three dimensions are congruent to each other. 
A parallelepiped itself is an instance of a prism’ (Ovchinnikov 2011: 
51). In addition to indicating an optical triangular prism that refracts 
the white light into a spectrum of colours, the etymology of the word 
prisma (from prizein ‘to saw’) signifies the ‘thing sawn’. Both sonically 
and visually, Box with the Sound bears witness to the process of being 
sawn and cut into a geometric object that is closed and separated from 
the rest. 
It is in this gesture of the initial cut-up, the act of demarcating, 
where Serres locates the origin of our cultures, knowledge and 
dominion, but also the prime objectifying act of the juridical – to decide 
on a case (cause) designates the origin of the ‘thing’ (chose) (Serres 2015: 
59). Nomos emerges as a measure or a rule by which appropriation or 
division takes place and order is established. Both law and geometry 
emerge from borders, bounds, and analytical thought; and while 
geometrical ‘precision [ justesse] succeeded even better than justice ... 
justice, on this point, preceded precision, while identifying it with itself ’ 
(Serres 2017: 19). Geometrical orientation is in place when Emmanuel 
Kant refers to the right as ‘a straight line’, but also justice’s perpendicular 
precision of ‘a right angle’ that ‘divides the space on both sides equally’ 
(Kant 1999: 32-3). Regardless of which precedes the other, there is 
an intrinsic obsession with structures and symmetries manifested in 
judgments, calculus and law thus ‘institutions are, in origin, things that 
stand, constructions, structures’ (Goodrich 2010: 190). 
The cube, one of the five Platonic solids, is equated with the element 
of ‘earth’, the solid and hard matter in which law’s formation and 
action manifests itself. The law marks the space in which it executes 
and performs, by erecting literal and metaphorical walls in which 
only that what is legal can enter, a locus in which the judicial power 
is contained, but still permeable to the outside (Mohr 2011: 110). As 
Peter Goodrich succinctly comments, ‘it is without doubt the case that 
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rendering walls, or rendering justice, is a play upon surfaces, a war 
over appearances and more specifically the sites of enunciation, the 
auditoria, and hence jurisdictions of law’ (Goodrich 2010: 207). Indeed, 
law attains its standing from declaring a right ( jus dicere). Drawing 
on the etymological root (deik- ‘to show’), Jean-Luc Nancy comments 
that the act of showing is simultaneous to the articulation of law thus 
juridical in its nature – the ‘ jurisdiction takes on a pleonastic quality, 
with jus and dicere simply emphasising what is inherent to each other’ 
(Leung 2015: 130, Douzinas 2007). For law to bestow a right or grant 
a ‘voice’ to a subject in a court it needs to refer to a place of standing 
– locus standi. Beyond this material gesture in which law establishes 
its form and thereby gives rise to an object or recognises a subject, the 
edifice of law resonates the word and logic of law, or as Serres notes 
‘[g]rammar and logic create a world in their own image’ (Serres 2016: 
101, 193). From an incision to a voice, from hard to soft, from nomos 
to logos, law’s performative gesture and language manifest themselves 
in, through and from within the standing statue.  
In his philosophical treatise on sculpture Statues, Serres in his own 
idiosyncratic way transverses different epochs, disciplines, myths and 
artefacts to demonstrate that statue is the foundation for the emergence 
of the subject-object relation, the rise of collectives, and thus the origin 
of our knowledge. From a tombstone to social and technological 
edifices, a statue manifests its static equilibrium, an ordered stability 
that situates, fixates and weighs with its presence. While statues 
represent important markers that stabilise relations, their inertness also 
carries the potential of stagnancy and rational oppression. To this hard 
matter, which is always local, Serres introduces its counter(point), that 
of music, which is soft, global and omnipresent. 
Both of them at the vague border of being and non-being: the statue, 
appearing, is born to being, makes it be born, drives it to propagate 
itself in its own and dense neighborhood, whereas music, disappearing, 
ceaselessly leaves being toward non-being. Two dual or contraposed 
ontologies. … The appearance of statuary equilibrium is perpetuated 
in a permanent and definitive stability. In deviation from equilibrium, 
music goes and runs by means of a perpetual and immanent instability: 
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stopping marks its disappearance. … Two dual or contraposed 
mechanics. … The statue ends time and starts space; music finishes 
space and makes its début in time. Each art defies the space or time 
in the other. Two dual and contraposed aesthetics. … Through the 
signal, music passes from noise to language, without touching either 
of them. The statue remains in silence (Serres 2015: 193-94). 
Serres’s philosophy is fundamentally drawn to crossings and 
bridging divisions, hence, despite this apparent dualism he aims to 
indicate their complementarity, the ‘secret relation of duality’ by which 
they both precede language and knowledge (ibid: 191). The apparent 
static entity of the statue is united with that which surrounds it, both 
circum- (around) and -stance (stand), a position that is not ‘purely stable 
or utterly chaotic’ but remains between order and chaos, logic and 
sense – thus it becomes a ‘dynamical statue’ (Assad 1999: 103-120).5 An 
equilibrium is not static but always dynamic (Webb 2018: 23). Such a 
view not only goes against our rationalist thinking but it also liberates 
the statue – its meaning and presence – and infuses it with agency 
that in a non-linear manner connects and crosses different spatial and 
temporal instances to trace out and render visible our foundation of 
our culture, collectivity and mastery. 
Box with the Sound, similarly, refers to this duality of systems in its 
title and execution. By putting a speaker in the box which plays the 
sound of its construction the artist ‘completely split the process and the 
object. And yet put them both back together again’ (Morris 1968). The 
box synchronously inhabits different spatial and temporal instances – 
formation and form, production and presence – or as Brandon LaBelle 
comments ‘is both here and there, present and past, audible and fixed, 
for its presence is made dependent upon the recording of its past, thereby 
making explicit the presence of the box as material form through the 
replaying of its very construction’ (LaBelle 2015: 81-2). Interestingly, 
in contrast to common musical composing, as Seth Kim-Cohen notes, 
the ‘score’ reveals itself only at the end and paradoxically becomes 
‘both precedent and descendent of [its own] realization’ (Kim-Cohen 
2009: 49). In this way, the work of art continuously refers to its own 
ongoing process of re-making, which never stops despite the ‘cube 
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being a paragon of completeness’ (Sylvester 2002: 243). 
Law functions based on a precedent, a prescription, an established 
norm, a score.6 Similar to the box’s sound, it also implies a source that 
emanates, establishes, informs and becomes a normative presence. 
The continuum of law’s own formation, even though it is contingent 
and subjected to continuous change, remains static in its formation 
and is dependent on its origin – stare decisis – that is, to stand by 
things decided that support and substantiate its very standing. As 
Peter Fitzpatrick observes: ‘Sustained in the force of the origin, law 
remains what it is in its beginning, enduring in a “time out of mind”, 
a permanent rule’ (Fitzpatrick 2011: 89). In reference to Morris’s 
box, Allen S. Weiss notes that the ‘ultimate paradigm of sound art’ 
is the fact that it is ‘determined by sound production as a dialogical 
activity, a manifestation of social relations, even when it arises from 
the most seemingly irrevocable solipsism’ (Migone 2012: 8). Indeed, 
the work ‘resonates as a self-referential object: what is heard is process 
and yet what is seen is the result of such process’ (LaBelle 2015: 81). 
The ‘own making’, already given in the title of the work, explicitly 
states its self-referential re-creation and permanence. The process is 
encapsulated in the verbal interplay ‘from making to made’ where 
the box continuously actualises itself within an already (in)formed 
structure. Correspondingly, while law manifests itself as a dialogical 
activity, its continuous self-referentiality of its own origin, precedent, 
structure, and principle is what founds, maintains and sustains it. The 
law’s ‘self-grounding’ manifests in its own relation to time, space and 
action (Fitzpatrick 2011: 70). However, this grounding is not static 
but, as Sara Ramshaw substantiates, it is in this continuous tension 
between law’s origin of its own formation and its own renewal where 
law’s inherent improvisational quality manifests itself (Ramshaw 
2013a). Morris’s box reminds us that what is represented in front of us, 
proceeds or simultaneously partakes in the process of remaining. For 
law to confirm its edifice it needs to move so it can proclaim, enunciate, 
spread and enfold; it is in constant flux (Barr 2016, Manderson 2000). 
Both present and spread out, the sounding box echoes law’s normative 
constructions by informing space and time with its own resounding 
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(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015, Valverde 2015, Mawani 2014). 
Law is, I propose, a dynamic statue par excellence: ‘Statue or thesis: 
singular; equilibrium: duality; system: plurality’ (Serres 2016: 289).
Beyond this apposite analogy by which Box with the Sound 
encompasses the intrinsic interconnectedness between law’s form 
and sounding, more significantly, it leads us to witness the process by 
which the intangible quality of sound concurrently informs its material 
opposite. While the resonating sound from within the box disturbs the 
stillness of the object it also materialises that object’s physicality and 
presence. In that sense, the sound not only gives form to the object – 
sound fills the box and expands the object beyond its walls. 
Facet 3 [Sound]
Different areas of scholarship have turned to ‘sound’ as both an object 
of study and a methodological tool. This apparent resurfacing of sound 
is not merely a response to the arguably predominant ocular-centric 
perspectives that have organised and arranged Western knowledge 
( Jay 1993, Sterne 2003, Erlmann 2010). Sensory studies have traced 
the historical, socio-cultural, but also normative conceptions that the 
aural and sensorial inform in the constructions and understandings 
of our society and political life (Howes & Classen 2014, Smith 2007, 
Panagia 2009). In parallel, sound studies have invited trans-disciplinary 
scholarship and prompted a panoply of philosophical, political, cultural 
and aesthetic readings that think about and with sound (Schulze 2018, 
Lavender 2017, Chow & Steintrager 2011). Accordingly, sound not 
only informs the expanding scholarship on experimental music and 
sound art practices, technological sound processing, performative 
and voice practices, but is also a means to apprehend and explore the 
resonating digital, economic and media realms (Herzogenrath 2017, 
Ernst 2016, Dyson 2014). Sound’s indiscernible noncoincidental 
quality – the continuously being entangled with subjectivity and 
objectivity – is ‘what makes sound such an elusive and inexhaustible 
topic, and one that can be approached in various ways: as history, 
culture, discipline, fantasy, ideology, and much more’ (Steintrager & 
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Chow 2019: 12). And, of course, as law too.
Law has extensively been studied through its representational, 
discursive and performative instances – as image, text and voice. In 
such a manner, sound, and law’s auditory potentials, have generally 
been implied or taken merely as a corollary to the understanding and 
actualisation of law, or any of its specific areas (Ramshaw 2013b, 
Constable 2013, Sherwin & Wagner 2013).  In view of the emergence 
of sound (and auditory) studies, the recognition of and approaching 
law acoustically has been both necessary and momentous. It is along 
these lines that the pioneering work Acoustic Jurisprudence by James 
Parker successfully achieves the aim to frame and demonstrate ‘ just how 
many dimensions of legal thought and practice the acoustic touches, 
and just how important it is, therefore, that those of us who spend our 
time thinking about and practising law begin to account for it’ (Parker 
2015a: 6). Parker neatly traces, contextualises and situates this against 
the contemporary legal scholarship, which despite its erudite and rich 
exploration of law, he argues, has turned deaf ear to sound, and thus 
rightly calls for recognising ‘that all legal thought and practice necessarily 
takes place in and in relation to sound’ (ibid, emphasis in original).
As shown so far, this discussion concurs with and pursues this 
position, but with a focus that goes beyond the initial understanding 
of sound as created by legal institutions, procedural practices or 
pronouncements of judgments; or sound as a medium in and through 
which persons express themselves; or sound as a subject’s voice that 
needs to be recognised so it can be heard; or sound associated with 
music as a metaphor of law. This discussion rather aims to engage 
with sound before it is objectified or becomes a medium of law’s own 
instrumental logic. That is to say, from a system such as law, it is well 
expected that the peculiar ephemerality of sound does not prevent 
its common tendency and ability to objectify things (or any abstract 
matter); it includes sound in its system of values and instrumental 
relations, of which intellectual property rights (copyright and 
trademarks), regulation of noise pollution and sonic weaponisation 
are clear examples (Rahmatian 2015, Mopas 2019, Parker 2015b). In 
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his insightful discussion on legal imagination of sound, Veit Erlmann 
rightly criticises the propensity of ‘instrumentalist and objectifying 
discourses of law’s sound’, which he argues, ‘not only neutralize sound 
as a mere medium and in the process uncritically perpetuate sound’s 
absence from musico-aesthetic and legal constructions of subject-
object relationship, but they also foreclose the possibility of engaging 
sound’s agency in specific legal ways’ (Erlmann 2019: 152, emphasis in 
original). To this end, and through the concept of abjection, Erlmann 
provides an imaginative reading to demonstrate that what allows law 
‘to be itself ’ lies in its contradictory relation to sound: it being intrinsic 
to the legal person, subject’s voice, her utterance, while also absent 
from any substantial mattering to law’s function and its apprehension 
of sound (ibid: 153, 159).7 Once the discussion enters a courtroom (a 
hearing), sound indeed instantaneously becomes entangled with law’s 
own doing and the practice of legal interpretations of expressions, 
meanings, voices and songs through and in which subjectivities arise 
and juridical reason revolves. In an attempt to apprehend law’s sound 
and avoid this objectifying and instrumentalising force of law, but also 
that of its discourse, I turn my attention to sound that is integral to 
law and constitutive of its bearing.
But then what is sound really? Which sound do we refer to when 
we think about sound and its relation to law? What is the sound of law? 
Sound is indeed ‘a particular object that has no substance … a kind 
of ideal object that nonetheless has real material effects’ (Cecchetto 
2013: 2). This incorporeal quality of sound, Jane Gaines indicates ‘has 
historically presented a problem for aesthetic theory as well as for legal 
theory’ since, in contrast to representation, sound cannot be grasped 
because its materiality is an occurrence which ‘gradually ceases to exist 
just as we have apprehended it’ (Gaines 1991: 116-17). Sound is never a 
finite object. Elusive to representation, it manifests a particular ‘mode 
of being [that is] in a constant state of flux’, multiple and heterogeneous, 
neither visible nor tangible, always ‘ontologically vague and semantically 
imprecise’ (Dyson 2009: 5). Sound can be an object, a vibration, wave, 
event, or flux, and its intangible but nonetheless reverberating material 
presence thus remains open to different imaginative, auditory and 
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scientific comprehensions, as well as philosophical conceptualisations 
(O’Callaghan 2007, Cox 2018). Accordingly, sound’s indiscernible 
nature lends itself to idealist, phenomenalist, visuocentric and 
materialist conceptions of sound. These conceptions, in turn, can indeed 
be meaningfully utilised as imaginative conceptual and methodological 
tools for exploring not only law’s understanding of sound, but also law’s 
own sounding. For the purposes of this discussion, I refer to sound in its 
most wide-ranging capacity – as an auditive quality in all its conceptual 
and (f)actual potentials. Sound art theorist Douglas Kahn provides a 
constructive elucidation:
By sound I mean sounds, voices, and aurality—all that might fall  
within or touch on auditive phenomena, whether this involves actual 
sonic or auditive events or ideas about sound or listening; sounds 
actually heard or heard in myth, idea, or implication; sounds heard 
by everyone or imagined by one person alone; or sounds as they fuse 
with the sensorium as a whole’ (Kahn 1999: 3, emphasis in original). 
This open-ended apprehension of sound resonates with law’s 
multiple manifestations and actualisations and it also puts forward 
an understanding of how they both remain entities that embody 
different qualities and effect. Put differently, it allows for articulating 
and grasping the ‘sonicity’ of law beyond its aural qualities (Ernst 
2016). In this regard, two material accounts of sound are important to 
the discussion here. Returning to Box with the Sound, one of sound’s 
qualities is that it has a tendency to envelop or blend by informing a 
single entity. Since its elusive borderless entity withstands any possible 
definition, for it to become ‘a specific sound’ requires ‘a boundary. … 
a context in order to become a thing, a sonic body, a sonic object: a 
sound’ (Kim-Cohen 2017: 51). So, for the sonorous to materialise, as 
François Bonnet comments, it needs ‘to give it body – to give it a body, 
even’ (Bonnet 2016: 64, emphasis in original). He continues, ‘to give 
sound this body is to place it into matter, to put it in place, or rather, in 
milieu. This is the necessary prerequisite in order for sound to exist – 
that is, to be audible – but also in order for sound to make a mark and 
thus to make a territory of the place’ (ibid: 64-5). Accordingly, sound 
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not only reverberates the judicial gesture of setting boundaries but also 
materialises itself, or rather delivers with itself the ‘immediate presence 
of the real, in all its concrete materiality’ (LaBelle 2015: xv). This is not 
to say that sound can ever be a fully separated entity but, as in Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s understanding of the body, it is ‘the unity of a being outside 
itself ’ (Nancy 2008: 133). Echoing Serres’s dynamic statue, it is in the 
constant extension of the body that Nancy identifies its tension, which 
etymologically he traces in the Greek word tonos – ‘A body is a tone’ 
(ibid: 134). 
In addition to this mattering quality of sound, its expansion, 
amplification and diversification discerns its relational quality. The 
quality of sound, LaBelle comments, is ‘intrinsically and unignorably 
relational: it emanates, propagates, communicates, vibrates, and agitates; 
it leaves a body and enters others; it binds and unhinges, harmonizes 
and traumatizes’ (LaBelle 2015: xi). With its potential to disperse, 
disseminate and envelope sound clearly challenges, subverts and resists 
the separations and distinctions informed by law; it occupies space, 
it extends by creating an acoustic space as a ‘sphere of simultaneous 
relations’ (McLuhan & McLuhan 1988: 110). While reaching this 
condition may be law’s ultimate disposition, this understanding of 
sound does not only comprise the formations of subjectivities; but 
rather, being ‘an inherently relational and “mediational” phenomenon’ 
it provides a possibility to move away from the dualistic understanding 
and relationship between subject and object, upon which law subsists 
(Born 2019: 198). Sound, as Salomé Voegelin suggests, ‘is never about 
the relationship between things, but is the relationship heard’ (Voegelin 
2010: 49). Hearing the relationship is a shift towards the middle where 
law essentially lies.  
Facet 4 [Noise]
Law, or ius, etymologically carries the notion of  ‘that which is binding’, 
and shares the same root with iungere, that is ‘to join’. On the condition 
that objects and subjects have been recognised, law validates itself in 
the relation – it binds two extremes, positions, or subjects by joining 
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them together in a relation. These relations, regardless of their cause 
and effect, are established communication paths that law not only 
informs but also implicitly and explicitly partakes in by creating 
objects, signs and patterns of interaction that give rise to its ordering 
nature. To grasp this relational quality of law, Serres suggests that ‘the 
first legal object was cord, the bond … [but not] abstractly in the terms 
of obligation and alliance, but more concretely in attachment, a cord that 
materializes our relations or changes them into things’ (Serres 1995a: 
45, emphasis in original). In order for law to fasten our relations it can 
be inferred that the cord requires the right tension to balance out the 
forces of the two ends. Accordingly, the attunement is achieved only 
through the right adjustment of the vibrating string, and that is where 
law’s common likeness to universal harmony is often heard.   
There is a long tradition of associating the idea(l) of well-balanced 
order with harmonious music. Perhaps for all the right reasons, music 
remains a metaphor of law, ‘both a description and a source of law’ 
(Manderson 1999: 1630). However, while this quality of the divine 
law is associated with Pythagoras’s discovery of harmonia, before the 
term attained its meaning of a ‘string of a lyre’ and ‘tuning’ it had 
originally designated ‘fitting together, connection, or joint’, a purely 
mathematical expression of concordant intervals (McKirahan 2010: 91). 
In contrast to this arithmetic understanding of harmony, in Harmony 
of the World, Johannes Kepler elaborates a geometric understanding 
of harmony as congruence of three-dimensional bodies and their 
proportions, thus ‘cube is a geometric harmonia because it is joined 
together in three dimensions’ (Kepler 1997, McKirahan 2010: 358-
59, citing Nichomachus the Pythagorean). Before harmony attains its 
sonic and musical quality it establishes itself, yet again, in the legal 
and geometrical – both abstract and material – act of joining and 
connecting. It is here, I propose, that the initial gesture of establishing 
a relation instantiates the sonorous quality to law, and where the sound 
of its making can be apprehended. 
Conventionally, harmony stands against noise which is understood 
as an interference or disturbance that opposes order. The tendency to 
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organise noise is therefore not only reserved for the understanding of 
music as ‘organised sound’ but one that reflects and makes audible the 
formation of society, and its instances of power and authority (Attali 
1985). The disorderly quality of noise is law’s opposite; a behaviour, an 
utterance, an unruly formation or conflict that needs to be disciplined 
and silenced. Noise not only remains contrary to any reasonable 
expression in court, but also a backdrop against which any order is 
possible (Parker 2015: 160-66). In being omnipresent and forceful, noise 
establishes the omnipotence of the court and its reverberating halls in 
which one who is heard also listens or obeys the law (Whitney 2011). 
In contrast to the common antagonistic approaches to noise, 
information theory identifies noise as an integral element of the 
channels that transmit signals. This technical notion of noise informs 
Serres’s notion ‘parasite’, which in addition to its biological and social 
connotations also reads as static (noise) in English. Through these 
different meanings Serres recognises the third element, that of the 
parasite or noise always present in the middle, as an integral and hence 
ineliminable part of any relation or medium. This condition, ‘ostensibly 
forbidden by classical logic’ introduces a third as a middle in which 
relations break, exchanges take place, things pass through and events 
occur – it becomes a fuzzy field between two oppositions (Brown 
2013: 87). The equivocal quality of noise presents ‘a generalised theory 
of ordering, of mediation and relationships’ that can be applied to an 
array of different relationships, yet it is always localised and specific 
to the relation (ibid: 97). In that sense, noise stands as an unavoidable 
universal, a middle, an intermediary, a medium upon which systems 
in question depend. As a constitutive element of any relation, noise 
encapsulates the acts of creation and transformation, compels systems 
to emerge or collapse, and is where the (trans)formation of our societies, 
cultures and knowledge lies. The recognition of noise entails that there 
is no system without noise and ‘this constant is a law’ (Serres 2007: 12). 
In that sense, noise is the initial act of demarcating a line on a 
white space, it is the act of appropriating or intercepting, or any act of 
violence that aims to establish itself, its power, its parasitic presence, 
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and thus create an arrangement that works in its own favour. That 
is to say, before a relation is established, and thereby an exchange is 
made possible, a violent act, a sacrifice, a gesture of delimitation is 
what precedes it. If noise, however, does not destroy the relation or 
fill the space with clamour within which communication is no longer 
possible, it reveals its ‘functional role’ to instil a new system with a new 
equilibrium, a transitory one until the next parasite strikes again and 
covers the area in its reverberating noise (ibid: 168). The intermediary 
in any given relation, in this way, is who has the most power, who is 
loud enough ‘and who makes others be quiet. … To say anything at 
all, but to prevent others from saying. It is enough to thunder. Power 
is nothing but the occupation of space’ (ibid: 142). While produced 
locally it nevertheless moves ‘in a single direction and soon it fills the 
space, the whole space’ (ibid: 41). From a means to medium to milieu, 
noise manifests its sonic quality. 
For a system such as law, Serres observes, intervenes to reverse the 
one-directionality of the abuse and ‘invents a double, two-way arrow 
that seeks to bring flows into balance through exchange or contract; 
at least in principle, it denounces one-sided contracts, gifts without 
countergifts, and ultimately all abuses’ (Serres 1995: 36-7). Law plays 
an important role in Serres’s contemplation on origins, relations and 
formations. He perceives law both as an abstract and material process, 
system or agency that binds us into collectivity and enables social 
relations, but also as an analytical tool that delimits and decides, thus 
essentially informing object-subject relationships (Mandic 2017: 513). 
However, if noise holds the position of a third, middle or intermediary 
in any set of relations – irrespective of whether it stands for a concept, 
a concrete entity or an inanimate object – advances a reasoning to 
contend that law is noise par excellence (Mandic 2014). Similar to 
noise, law attaches in the middle and recognises the principles and 
conditions according to which subjects and objects are recognised and 
their relations become permissible. In this way, law manifests itself as 
a means and medium that engenders the relation in question, that is, 
it being of the relation. On that account, it is here where law gains its 
formal standing, thereby generating its authority not from being fixed 
531
Law with the Sound of Its Own Making
in a position but from being in the functioning of the relations, by being 
‘multiple and collective’ (Serres 2007: 64). Hence it is in law’s interests 
to organise our ‘concrete life as a group’ and ‘for everyone to be fixed 
in place and fixed in essence’ (ibid: 124, 64). From static to static, from 
noise to statue, law resonates and encloses subjects and objects in its 
concrete occurrence. Noise, writes Serres,
settles in subjects as well as in objects, in hearing as well as in space, in 
the observers as well as in the observed, it moves through the means 
and the tools of observation, whether material or logicial, hardware 
or software, or languages; [noise] is part of the in-itself, part of the 
for-itself (Serres 1995b: 13).
The continuous background noise both informs and sustains law, 
its (internal) murmuring, resonance, and nauseating properties. 
Tyler Whitney is right when she argues that noise is ‘both a crucial 
precondition for the legal system’s functionality and an ongoing strategy 
of control and coercion’ (Whitney 2011: 345). Such a functionality 
and control of law does not come only from noise as reverberation 
but also from its silent presence (Constable 2007, Mulcahy 2019). 
On that account, noise apprehends the abstract and material nature 
of law’s rights and duties, its recognition of subjects and objects, its 
concrete but transforming nature, its prescription and translation, its 
fixity on function and constant fabrication. That is to say, since every 
‘sense coexists with its excess, the noise from which sense has yet to 
emerge’, law both adds and filters out noise and it is always part of its 
functioning (Webb 2018: 22). 
Noise is turbulent matter that gives rise to forms, precedes order 
and disorder, as well as meaning and language; its power is assaulting, 
its presence is omnipresent, immanent. Therefore, noise is not a 
phenomenon in itself but ‘every phenomenon is separated from it’ 
(Serres 1995b: 13). Law actualises its form by the resonating sound of 
noise that gives rise to its form as a system of relations. Noise not only 
attains an acoustic quality that allows us to ‘hear’ law but also leads us 
to the middle where law sustains itself. By means of employing several 
meanings that the word ‘middle’ conveys – a means, medium and milieu 
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– noise simultaneously manifests law’s multiple facets and grasps the 
abstract and material quality of its normative presence, its lawscape, 
or the soundscape in which it reverberates (Bottomley & Moore 2015, 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015, Parker 2015a). 
Box with the Sound displays the perpendicular serene appearance 
of law surrounded by noise that both informs it and emanates from 
it.8 The law closes onto itself and becomes a black box. But can we 
actually hear it?
Facet 5 [Hearing]
Sound is intrinsically coupled with hearing. In contrast to the other 
senses that require external stimuli, hearing is continuously actual and 
acute, always immersed even when silent, since the ear is ‘always open, 
always supplementing its primary materiality’ (Kim-Cohen 2009: xx). 
Hearing, nevertheless, is not only related to its sensory meaning but 
also to that of comprehending.9 It is not coincidental therefore that a 
hearing is the ultimate juridical act in which adjudication takes place 
and law’s sensorial and reasoning capacity – a sense and sense – come 
together.10
Two aspects need some clarification here. First, hearing needs to be 
distinguished from listening which ‘is a definite cultural practice’ that 
‘requires hearing but is not simply reducible to’ it (Sterne 2003: 19). 
Listening is fundamentally a political and ethical act that constructs 
collectives, recognises voices and subjectivities, infuses meaning to 
that what is said. Thus, it is informed by and subjected to sensorial 
apparatuses. Accordingly, the authorities of discourse and power, such 
as law, not only provide the means but also frame to what one can listen 
and aim to subjugate the listener to obey to what is said (Bonnet 2016, 
Douzinas 2007). Despite their nuanced but often interchangeable 
meanings, here I approach hearing as a perception of sound before 
it attains any meaning, that which precedes the realm of discursivity 
and signification, that is, logos.11 Second, Western epistemology has 
traditionally tended to both separate the senses, and consequently 
organise the senses according to a particular hierarchy. At the same 
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time, there has also been a tendency to understand hearing as a mirrored 
quality to that of seeing. Indeed, Box with the Sound encompasses 
such interplay between the auditory and the visual, immersion and 
perspective, interiors and surfaces, contact and distances that could 
challenge law’s predominant reliance on text and vision (Hibbitts 1994). 
However, such a dualistic approach needs to be carefully avoided, since 
it is not only restrictive but also not necessarily accurate, in particular 
when there is a tendency of idealising hearing over that of seeing (Sterne 
2003, Erlmann 2004, Classen 1993, Smith 2007). 
In The Five Senses, Serres goes beyond the hierarchical divisions of 
the senses by demonstrating their intermingling and expanding the 
narratives of sensorial bodies beyond their established traditions. His 
erudite deliberation aims to unravel instances in which the world is 
given to us but is out of reach because of the logocentric formations of 
different forms of power and authority, as well as the phenomenological 
sensations (again experienced through language) accorded to 
apprehending and experiencing the world. In short, ‘there are things, 
facts, a world beyond our language and logic’ (Serres 2016: 102). 
More than a coincidence, the section that concerns hearing is 
titled Boxes and uses the notion of box(es) to convey or expand on the 
act of hearing and thus go beyond the immediate realm of that what 
is audible. In a way, it is an attempt to ‘hear hearing’.12 To this end, 
more specifically, Serres recognises the boxes as an integral part of 
the processes in which hearing – bodily, institutionally, scientifically 
and even conceptually – takes place. In tracing the hearing, Serres 
identifies three kinds of audible. ‘The primary source of noise is within 
the body’ and its subliminal murmur spreads and integrates by forming 
‘a black box full of black boxes – molecules, cells, organs, systems – and 
gradually … it resolves into information’ (ibid: 106). All the rumbling, 
winds, thunders and earthquakes manifest the second kind of audible, 
which is ‘outside of the social and political’ but for which we build 
‘equally refined boxes around our bodies: wall, cities, houses, monastic 
cells’ (ibid: 107). The final comes from the collective and the hubbub 
which silences the previous two. This colossal noise, for Serres, is what 
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defines the social. What neutralises our sense of the world, he identifies 
in the collective din, the ‘autogenic clamour’ that encloses us, thus ‘[w]e 
live in that black box called the collective; we live by it, on it, and in it’ 
(Connor 2016: 10; Serres 2007: 10, 123). Sound is indeed ‘an artifact 
of the messy and political human sphere’ (Sterne 2003: 13). 
This imaginative gesture is intrinsic to Serres’s non-epistemological 
method by which the distinction between an object and a subject blur 
into becoming a ‘quasi-object’. Since the corporealising of the sensuous 
takes place across different planes and systems of relations, hearing is not 
reducible only to the ear and the anthropomorphic features it entails; the 
shell, the closure, the boundary, the skin, the box are also constitutive 
features of hearing (Schulze 2018: 54-82).13 This understanding of 
hearing incorporates but not necessarily reduces the idea of sound and 
hearing/listening only within formation of subjectivities as Nancy’s 
‘resonant subject’ (Nancy 2002: 21, Born 2019: 192-93). This reading, 
more specifically, provides a way in which hearing does not focus on 
the object as such (that what is heard), nor on the subject as a reference 
point in which hearing takes place (or makes sense) but on hearing as an 
act of transformation (Connor 2005: 158). Hearing, Serres suggests, is 
a process of transformation of matter, a continuous activity of passing 
boundaries, from one box to the next, a steady interchange of hard and 
soft, sensation and information. From the cellular level to that of the 
social, a chain of boxes receives and transmits, ‘yet the reception itself 
is not transmitted’ thus we are presented with the constant problem of 
not knowing what takes place inside the box (Serres 2016: 139). Since 
such a reception of what happens inside is never attainable, Serres argues 
that in order to trap sensation we tend to build similar set of models 
which function as ‘abstract receivers’. In this sense, ‘[w]e create boxes 
in order to hear, we connect our ear to a conch to hear the sound of the 
sea, we build spaces with the express purpose of listening, or hearing 
each other’ (ibid: 139-40). Law creates a protective layer, it stabilises 
our relations, and it becomes an ‘abstract receiver’. A body, a box, a 
statue, an organism, or law 
… raises a taut sculpture or statue of skin, vibrating to the voluminous 
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sound … We hear through our skin and feet. … We live in noises 
and shouts, in sound waves just as much as in spaces, the organism is 
erected, anchors itself in space…The moving statue finds its balance 
in the din as a fish does in water’ (ibid: 141)
From a sense to sense, Serres leads us to apprehend hearing as an 
integral element that constitutes any system, a body in its most general 
sense, a technical device, or an institution such as law – it is an act 
that simultaneously receives and transmits. It is in this negotiation 
between hard and soft, matter and information, that law (a box of its 
own) partakes in the construction of the social box, which is ‘defined by 
walls as well as by ideal’ and actively organises the ‘ubiquitous hearing’ 
coming from it (ibid: 149). Law is simultaneously a sounding and a 
hearing device that transforms and translates, but also knows well that 
‘[b]efore there can be successful meaning and communication – the 
precondition of logic and language – it must presuppose a music which 
is victorious over noise, must invent it, must risk composing it’ (ibid: 
126). 
It is along these lines that law manifests itself, yet again, as a means 
and a medium that transforms noise to information. It gives sense and 
preserves the system to remain, it turns matter into language, fills the 
milieu with information and thus declares itself as a ‘foundation of 
optimal communication’ that ‘is equated with music or harmony, an 
already transcendental condition’ (ibid). Music in this context, however, 
should not be understood as a transformation from ‘natural into the 
cultural’ but as ‘looping, labyrinthine interchange of the hard and the 
soft’ (Connor 2005: 159). It does not mean an ordered harmony but 
a sonorous quality – from noise to music to language – the sonic is 
law’s ‘pre-condition and its physical medium’ (Serres 2016: 123). Law 
stands vertically and symmetrically whilst submersed in reverberation, 
it hears and is heard; it is a hearing device that transforms, pursues and 
maintains. We may not hear its hearing, but we perceive its bearing.   
From living cells to the social order, boxes hear and try to make 
sense by translating matter to information and vice versa. Finally, 
Serres introduces the third cycle of hearing as that which needs to 
536
Danilo Mandic
turn ‘deaf ear to oneself and the group’ and that which we may simply 
call it knowledge: ‘It is as though the body were constructed like a 
box, or series of boxes, through which these cycles pass. As though 
the collective forms itself into box or boxes through which these flows 
circulate. And as though knowledge, a world crying out for more 
attentive hearing, constructs the largest white box of all’ (ibid: 111).
Facet 6 [Episteme]
Box with the Sound of Its Own Making indicates an acousmatic sound 
whose source cannot be seen but only heard. Acousma (‘the thing 
heard’) is associated with Pythagoras’s pedagogic gesture by which he 
was hiding behind a curtain and the only thing that his disciples, the 
akosumatikoi (‘the hearers’), could perceive was his utterance. While 
initially deployed as a technique to access and inform knowledge, the 
emergence of audio technology is what allowed for the separation of 
sound from its source and made it possible to hear sounds outside 
their original context.14 In addition to the two boxes: the one ‘as a 
finished and stable material fabrication, and the other as the continual 
replaying of its building’, there is an existence of a third box, that of 
a tape recorder (LaBelle 2015: 83). Primarily because of the work’s 
disposition, but also because of the technological constraints of 
the 1960s and the work’s large size, Morris hides the tape recorder 
from display and puts in another box.15 In electroacoustic parlance, 
the tape recorder is a black box in which an input signal is stored, 
transformed and manipulated before its output audio signal can be 
heard. The aim of a system as such ‘is to achieve “fidelity” between 
the input and the output, that is, to make them indistinguishable, at 
least ideally’ (Truax 1984: 8). The hardware of the sound production as 
an integral part of Morris’s box reminds us of law’s infrastructure, its 
material elements, techniques and passages that continuously structure 
norms and rules, translate legal enunciation, link facts to principles, 
and shape procedures to manifest and confirm law as a ‘regime of truth’ 
(McGee 2015). However, a perfect ‘fidelity is unattainable’ as there is 
always a touch of noise or distortion to the signal; otherwise, there 
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would be no intervention, transformation, or movement and law would 
become transparent (Truax 1984: 9).16 Law’s apparatus embraces noise 
to materialise its standing. Law is an immanent form of mediation, it 
receives and transmits, it hears and is heard, it resonates.
Law is a sonic artefact. Such an approach to viewing/hearing law 
discerns the acoustic qualities of law but also presents a rather different 
object of enquiry that is not perceivable otherwise. While the contexts 
upon and within which law’s effect on sounding and hearing are not 
directly considered in this discussion, that does not imply that our 
perceptions of law and its acoustics can possibly be extracted from the 
historical, social and cultural conditions that sustain it. By the same 
token, sound and its correlate of listening (and hearing) cannot but 
be acknowledged as inherently situated modes of reality from which 
identities and sonic bodies emerge, political and social realities are both 
assembled and challenged, and systemic relations of oppression are put 
on trial (Henriques 2011, Kane 2016, LaBelle 2018, James 2019). For 
the purposes of this reading, these aspects are suspended not because 
they are not integral to thinking about the ordering and normative side 
of law and its direct relation to sounding and hearing, but because of 
it. Far from essentialising sound, my intention here is not to claim any 
privileged status of sound, or that of hearing for that matter, but to think 
sonically with and through ‘sound’s pronounced mediality’ that, as 
argued here, conditions and informs law, but also demands the hearing 
of it (Cecchetto 2013: 10, Mandic et al 2021). Thinking sonically, in 
such a way, emphasises sound’s intangible and material quality; but 
also, its relational quality to apprehending law. Furthermore, this form 
of sounding out not only approximates to law, but also invites further 
exploration into the ways in which sound can indeed, practically, 
approximate, measure and sense law, its application and effect. In 
tracing different acoustic qualities, this exploration corroborates the 
inherent relation between law and sound and propounds that sound 
encapsulates and informs law’s dynamic matter. Beyond this ontological 
claim, sound proves its potential to question and bridge distinctions 
and to discern new passages of thinking about law. 
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Sound and its properties lend themselves to conceptual, theoretical 
and methodological modes to apprehend or instantiate new realms of 
understanding. But as Kahn notes, sound should not be understood as 
‘a destination’, but as ‘a potent and necessary means for accessing and 
understanding the world; in effect, it leads away from itself ’ (Sterne 
2012: 6). It is in this capacity that sound manifests its permeant and 
transitory qualities and challenges the existing distinctions, subject-
object correlations and instilled principles of Western modernity 
that law palpably resonates with. However, despite the imaginative 
potentials that sound provides, it is simultaneously subjected to 
various epistemic edifices that also tend to enclose and frame our 
understanding of it – that is, they define, close off, and validate their 
‘parasitic’ authority that often serves its own ends (ibid, Serres 2007). 
In that regard, despite sound’s conceptual and epistemic potential, the 
sonic knowledge production can still replicate Western epistemologies 
that have a tendency to inform the dualism between culture and 
nature, object and subject, and also to privilege Western white male 
conceptions (Goh 2017). Moreover, as Robin James demonstrates, we 
need to be mindful of the emerging scholarship attending to different 
‘concepts of acoustic resonance’ that come to inform, what she calls the 
‘sonic episteme’, which qualitatively replicate relations of domination 
and exclusion informed by neoliberalism and biopolitics (James 2019: 
3). Indeed, ‘[e]very possible kind of audible finds sites of hearing and 
regulation’ (Serres 2016: 111). 
Law, as a specific practice and discourse, informs its own episteme 
dependent on dichotomies and schisms but also on its logos. It 
continuously imitates its own initial gestures, it decides, encloses and 
defines so to inform an understanding and a way of knowing, thereby 
establishing its own epistemology. Strikingly, episteme resembles 
law, not only in its gesture of demarcating boundaries but also, as 
its etymology suggests, in its tendency to overstand and become a 
‘statue’ of its own.17 To challenge and inquire into law’s established 
epistemology and practice is the thing that essentially animates the 
multi-disciplinary nature of law and humanities scholarship, which 
for all the good reasons, has been evading any form of solidification 
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as a discipline (Kang 2019). Echoing the discussion above, as if this 
scholarship shares similar qualities to that of noise in identifying 
and introducing imaginative approaches to challenging established 
formations of legal knowledge and practice; noise is indeed a potential 
means to disrupt aesthetic, political and epistemological positions, or 
enclosed systems of relations such as law (Malaspina 2018, Hainge 
2013, Goddard et al 2012). 
This exploration is a response to such epistemological explorations. 
In addition to substantiating the inherent relation of law and sound, 
it also demonstrates how the object of attention and its resonance, as 
presented in Box with the Sound, coalesce and become its very method. 
Boxes inform practices, myths, epistemologies, different system of 
relations, enclose discourses, and while they contain, they also conceal 
– they are epistemic tools of ordering and makings sense, or simply 
world-making devices (Bauer et al 2020). In this reading, the box is 
approached beyond its role of a container of contents, but rather is put 
in direct tension with the content that informs its material – the box is 
instantiated by sound. Even if not visible, the acousmatic brings forward 
an understanding that it is not about concealing or obstruction, but 
rather ‘a means of bringing things into focus’ (Chow 2019: 117-18). 
The ‘thing heard’ exposes itself in the Morris’s box – the source of its 
own origin and finality – but it also reveals artist’s craftsmanship and 
practice in its execution. 
From sound to boxes to noise to law, this reading sounds out the 
gestures, instances, and functions that come before, inform and allow 
us to perceive law’s sonicity, or even think of legality as sonority. 
Resembling the Box with the Sound of Its Own Making, in the end, this 
exploration encloses onto itself, it resonates and reverberates, reflecting 
from within its box’s walls, it becomes its own noise and murmur.18 In a 
commentary about ‘resonance’ and its potential to demonstrate quality 
of things that go beyond ‘sign, a discourse, or a logos’, Erlmann finely 
summarises that ‘[a]n account of something such as resonance must 
therefore situate itself in a kind of echo chamber together with other 




We should be aware, however, of the norm we are using in 
constructing those chambers, those boxes.19 ‘To achieve a cubic or 
rectangular form’, as Morris states, ‘is to build in the simplest, most 
reasonable way, but it is also to build well’ (Morris 1993: 41).
Endnotes
1. In one of the notes that are part of the Marcel Duchamp’s The Bride 
Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even (Green Box) (1934), he proposes the 
idea of Sculpture Musicale. The note reads: ‘Sounds lasting and leaving 
from different places and forming a sounding sculpture which lasts’ 
(Duchamp 1975: 31). 
2. Statute and statue share the same etymology from Proto-Indo-European 
root stā- (‘to stand, set down, make or be firm’). Also, in Latin statuere 
(‘enact, establish’), status (‘position’), and stare (‘to stand’). On the inherent 
relation between law and a statue, Peter Goodrich notes: ‘An effigy, statue, 
or emblem represented and incorporated the reason of law, it was iconic in 
the specific sense of establishing the place – the theater, ecclesia, court or 
site of enunciation – of legality’ (Goodrich 1995:110). Importantly, while 
the terms statue and sculpture are used interchangeably, I acknowledge 
that they are two different artistic forms. 
3. Seth Kim-Cohen, for instance, introduces an understanding of ‘non-
cochlear’ sonic art that is not reduced only to the sonic realm but moves 
‘beyond the territory of the ear’. In coining this term, he is drawing on 
Marcel Duchamp’s ‘non-retinal’ visual art which rejected judgments of 
taste and beauty but also introduced conceptual quality to the existence 
and experiencing of art that goes beyond the eye (Kim-Cohen 2009).
4. I remain grateful for the detailed commentary and suggestions made by 
the anonymous reviewer who correctly recognised the topological quality 
of the box as a structural device to the paper. On that note, I am also 
grateful to Hyo Yoon Kang, Martin Zeilinger, and Matt Howard for 
their helpful comments on a draft of the paper.
5. Jean-Luc Nancy in his work Corpus makes a similar observation about 
law: ‘The corpus is neither chaos nor organism: it doesn’t fall in between 
the two, but lies somewhere else. It’s prose from a different space, not 
abyssal, systematic, grounded, or ungrounded. This is the space of the 
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law: its foundation slips away from its place—the law of the law itself 
being always unlawful. … Jurisdiction consists less in enunciating the 
absolute of the Law, or in unfolding its reasons, than in saying what the 
law can be here, there, now, in this case, in this place’ (Nancy 2008: 53).
6. A score has a meaning of a notch or line cut or scratched on a surface. In 
Old English sceran (‘cut through with a weapon’), and in Old German 
scheren (‘divide’).
7. In addition to its original meaning as a mask, the word ‘person’ has also 
been associated with per- sonare (‘to sound through’).
8. Robert Morris makes a direct reference to Marcel Duchamp’s work With 
Hidden Noise (1916), which has a cubic form and a ball of twine placed 
between two horizontal brass plates. Inside the ball of twine, an unknown 
object produces a sound when the object is moved.
9. Often the distinction that is made is that hearing is a ‘physiological 
phenomenon’ and listening as a ‘psychological act’. The former is based 
on bare sensorial stimuli, the latter requires an additional engagement 
to comprehend the meaning that sound carries. Jean-Luc Nancy makes 
an opposite distinction by referring to écouter (as listening) and entendre 
(as hearing). He aims to avoid the intentionality implied in the latter and 
develops an understanding of listening that attends to the former. Brian 
Kane identifies the nuances and various meanings and translations that 
exist in the French language and comments on the reasons for Nancy’s 
choice of words (Kane 2012). In this discussion, while I use hearing and 
listening interchangeably, I also attend to an understanding of a hearing 
as a sense that does not imply an immediate meaning making. 
10. In Old English heran (‘obey, judge’). A similar meaning is found in Proto-
Slavic (so)slušati. 
11. The notion of logos meaning to ‘say’, ‘speak’, or’ enunciate’, shares the 
same etymological root with the verb legein which also means to ‘gather’, 
‘receive’, ‘shelter’. Gemma Corradi Fiumara argues that the listening is 
‘unthinkable’ in the ‘tradition based on expressive language’, that is: ‘In 
the dizzy affirmation of our logos there is hardly “any” space left for the 
“hidden” but essential tradition of listening’ (Fiumara 1990: 29).
12. Marcel Duchamp in his work The Box of 1914 has a note which reads: 
‘One can look at seeing, one can’t hear hearing’ (Duchamp1975: 23). 
The sound and media theorist Jonathan Sterne comments that since 
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‘[a]ll our def initions of sound and sonic phenomena tend toward 
anthropomorphism’ it is difficult to imagine what sound and hearing 
would be beyond this. He continues: ‘If no sound is possible without 
hearing, then sound studies—but also many forms of politics—begins 
with hearing the hearing of others’ (Sterne 2015: 74).
13. The media theorist Vilém Flusser makes a similar observation: ‘Listening 
to music is the gesture that defeats the skin by transforming it from a 
boundary into a connection’ (Flusser 2014: 117).
14. The acousmatic is what the French composer Pierre Schaeffer in the 1950s 
refers to in developing his notion of a ‘sound object’ as a sound that is 
independent from its source and meaning. Acousmatic music is composed 
with audio technologies and challenges the traditional forms of composing 
and qualities of sound (See for instance, Kane 2014). 
15. In a drawing/instruction (1960) for Box with the Sound of Its Own Making 
Morris notes: ‘Construct box large enough to house recorder’. Morris also 
writes: ‘Construct walnut box with hand tools. Record sounds during 
construction. Play back through tape recorder’ (Weiss 2013: 84).
16. Bruno Latour notes that law ‘is the least technical of all forms of enunciation: 
never can it replace orality, textuality, the laborious embodiment of 
meaning, just as one cannot calculate law by summing it up by the 
mediation of some mechanical device’ (Latour 2010: 272, emphasis in 
original).
17. In Greek epistasthai (‘know how to do’) from epi- (‘over, near’) and histasthai 
(‘to stand’).
18. The resonating sound (of law) reflects from the walls within. In Latin murus 
(‘a wall’), Old English mære (‘landmark, border, boundary’).
19. In Latin norma (‘carpenter’s square, rule, precept’). 
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